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1 Introduction
Conventional collateral often fails in unconventional economies. This is captured by a story titled
“Ghost Collateral” published by Reuters On May 31st, 2017: bankers in China found some of the col-
lateralized physical assets suddenly varnished, some never existed, and some others have been pledged
repeatedly to multiple lenders.1 On January 14, 2018, Financial Times reported a similar story: loans
in Russia are often issued with fake collateral.2 In these economies, financial contracts are hard to
enforce due to various institutional flaws such as loose legal enforcement or hidden credit histories. Yet,
the exchange of financial resources is known to be central for economic development (Buera et al., 2011;
Moll, 2014). This raises the question how lending occurs where institutions are poor but substantial
growth has been achieved.
We propose corruption, a widespread phenomenon in developing/emerging economies, to be an
answer. The idea traces back to Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), and Liu (1985) who argue power and
bribery can access firms to resources. In this paper, we posit corruptive relations with government
officials are essential for firms to get loan resources when institutions are poor. Corruption cases of this
kind have been reported as true stories. In 2015, one of the most powerful officials in China named
Yongkang Zhou was arrested for corruption; the investigation uncovered he helped an entrepreneur
to get a bank loan of 600 million RMB in 2013 as a reward for a bribery of over 14 million RMB.3
In this true story of corruption, banks control the loan resources, the entrepreneur demands loans,
and the official connects banks with the entrepreneur for bribes. Like in any corruption cases, bribes
incentivize the official. Unlike in many corruption cases where the official offers subsidy or contracts
with beneficial pricing to his connected entrepreneurs, here the corrupt official does not control or
allocate resources directly, instead he serves the role of financial intermediation.
To sort out the elements of incentivization for banks, entrepreneurs, and officials, formally we build
a model of limited commitment. In this model, the entrepreneur has an incentive to distract loan
resources to low-quality projects, seize private returns, and avoid debt payment; the bank becomes
held up in non-performing loans financing low-quality projects due to the soft-budget constraint; the
1See “Ghost collateral’ haunts loans across China’s debt-laden banking system” by Reuters.(link).
2See “How to fix Russia’s broken banking system” by Financial Times (link).
3According to Pei (2016), the 14 million RMB bribery was paid by an entrepreneur named Liu Han to purchase a
tourism project from Zhou’s son, Zhou Bin, at a price of 20 million RMB while the fair market value of the project was
under 6 million RMB.
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official, however, possesses the power, the information, and the social connections to track credit
histories and ban defaulting firms from future loans. Hereby, the entrepreneur and the bank facilitate
unsecured lending by forming a corruptive relationship with the official, making the official the de
facto intermediary between the two. The continuation value of this relationship for repeated loan
issuance corrects the entrepreneur’s distorted incentives, makes unsecured lending safe, and maintains
the investment quality. As such, the bribe to the official is nothing but a reward for a much needed
service in an environment with poor institutions.
To evaluate the importance of corruption for finance, ideally we would quantify our framework with
data to estimate the total amount of corruption-backed loans in reality. Unfortunately, this would
be an extremely challenging task, because corruptive activities are known to be secretive, to take
various forms, and to be hard to measure properly. Hence, we follow an approach by Fisman (2001),
estimating how financial variables respond when corruption is tackled down by the anti-corruption
investigation or, in other words, when the corruption channel for finance is blocked. For this purpose,
our model provides several testable predictions. It predicts the anti-corruption investigation destroys
the corruptive relationship, breaks the commitment, and causes the soft-budget constraint problem to
arise for bank-entrepreneur pairs connected with the official under investigation. Consequently, the
entrepreneur defaults, leaving the bank with non-performing loans. Moreover, the blocked corruption
channel drives the bank to search for yields and the entrepreneurs for alternative financing options.
If the entrepreneur can substitute corruption with collateralized borrowing, the default would appear
strategic: firm performance stays unaffected, financial status remains intact, but other financing tools
are more actively utilized.
We take these predictions to data. Although we believe corruption-backed finance is present ev-
erywhere, we choose to examine data from China because in recent years the Chinese government
implemented extensive financial reforms to activate more financing tools, providing an ideal institu-
tional background for identifying the substitution between corruption and other collateral. Moreover, in
2013 the Chinese president launched an intensive national anti-corruption campaign with an enormous
amount of investigations and arrests, generating large data variations for testing our theory. Figure
1 plots the time series of the total number of investigated (“Shuang Gui”) corrupt officials against
the ratio of non-performing loans before and after 2013: from 2012 to 2013, the arrests rose by 23%
and, from 2013 to 2014, by a further 42.1%; interestingly, the ratio of non-performing loans increased
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simultaneously. This is consistent with our theory.
We turn to more detailed panel data to test the true empirical success of our theory. At the
regional level, we study the correlation between the amount of non-performing loans and the number
of arrested corruption officials. At the firm level, we compile a unique data set on firm defaults and
on firm implications by the anti-corruption investigations, combining information publicized by the
government and disclosed by news media. With this firm panel, we employ a staggered difference-in-
difference approach to estimate a firm’s responses in default probability and in other financial indicators
following the arrest of a corrupt official connected with this firm. Our purpose is to identify the true
causal relationship stemming from the anti-corruption investigation.
We find robust and powerful evidence supporting our predictions. At the regional level, non-
performing loans rise when the anti-corruption campaign intensifies. At the firm level, default prob-
ability increases once a firm becomes implicated by the anti-corruption investigation, but the firm’s
performance or financial status does not at all deteriorate. We interpret this evidence as a sign of
weaker incentives to repay the unsecured debt as implied by our theory, rather than the tightening
of their loan-payment capacity as suggested by alternative theories on corruption. Moreover, we find
firms turn to share-pledge financing or corporate bonds, and firm value drops accordingly. All these
findings point to corruption as an essential financing channel for firms connected with corrupt officials.
Our paper is related to several bodies of literature. It joins a recent empirical literature on how the
anti-corruption investigation impacts the Chinese economy (Chen and Kung, 2018; Fang et al., 2018,
Li et al., 2018). On a broader sense, it belongs to the literature studying the relationship between
corruption and growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Wei, 1999; Olken and Pande, 2012). While this
literature often links corruption with slower growth, some scholars have proposed corruption and bribes
can work as “grease” to speed up wheels of commerce when regulations are bad (Leff, 1964; Huntington,
1968; Liu, 1985). Empirically, Mauro (1995) and Svensson (2005) both examine cross-country aggregate
data and find evidence suggesting the relationship between corruption and growth is in fact mixed and
ambiguous. Our proposed corruption for finance reconciles some of these views.
We also build on the literature on soft-budget constraints faced by financial intermediaries when
borrowers’ commitment is limited and the enforcement mechanism is insufficient (Dewatripont and
Maskin, 1995, and Maskin and Xu, 2001). We join Boot (2000) to propose relationship lending and
specify corruption in particular as a solution for the SBC problem. Our work echos the literature on
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contract enforceability and economic institutions (Greif, 1993).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds a model to provide testable predictions.
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the key evidence. Section 5 explains our evidence is
unique to corruption for finance. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Model
We model an environment where monitoring credit is costly and extending credit is risky due to poor
institutions. The credit history of an entrepreneur is opaque, either because there lacks a well enforced
credit-recording system economy-wide, or because competition among banks and informal creditors
fragments credit histories. Therefore, entrepreneurs who defaulted in the past can easily borrow again
from new creditors. Pledging conventional physical collateral cannot guarantee the credit safety, as
physical assets’ ownerships can be hard to verify. Government officials are powerful: they can track
credit histories and influence credit allocations through their extensive connections with entrepreneurs,
banks, and other officials.4
This model serves two purposes: to illustrate how corruption supplements poor institutions by
enforcing financial commitments and to provide a tractable framework for deriving testable predictions.
To achieve these purposes, several elements are required: 1) limited commitment arising from moral
hazard that can be overcome by corruption; 2) observable financial instruments that will respond
when anti-corruption investigations destroy corruption; 3) testable predictions that can distinguish
corruption for financial intermediation from corruption for other economic uses.
2.1 Basic Setups
Time is discrete and lasts forever. The economy is populated by banks, entrepreneurs, and government
officials. There are one measure of banks, one measure of entrepreneurs, and NG measure of government
officials who participates in lending. All agents have linear utility over consumption. They discount
future utility at rate β ∈ (0, 1). The utility from consuming one consumption good is one.
Entrepreneurs use intermediate goods to produce consumption goods. They cannot self finance.
4Corrupt officials are different from mafia. Gangsters in mafia could punish the defaulting entrepreneur by killing him
and his family for example. The punishment that a corrupt official imposes on a defaulting entrepreneur is to terminate
an ongoing lending relationship, so that he/she can no longer obtain credit.
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In each period, banks are endowed with K units of intermediate goods. Banks can either lend the
intermediate goods to entrepreneurs, or invest in a safe storage technology G(K), G being a smooth
and concave function with G′′(·) < 0 < G′(·) < RH . Individual banks take r0, the return to the safe-
storage technology, as given.5 Denote the amount of intermediate goods banks allocate to safe-storage
technology as KS , then:
r0 = G
′(KS). (1)
An entrepreneurs owns s fraction of her firm’s equity. The measure of entrepreneurs with s share
or less is denoted NE(s), for s ∈ [0, 1] and NE(1) = 1. We simplify the entry and exit by assuming
an entrepreneur faces an exogenous probability δ of exit at the beginning of every period. An exiting
entrepreneur will be replaced by an identical entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs can form corruptive relationships with government officials for loan issuance. De-
veloping such an relationship is a privilege accessible only to a limited number of entrepreneurs. We
simplify the entry into corruption by assuming entrepreneurs form such relationships through random
matching, under which the probability of meeting an official is evenly distributed among entrepreneurs.
Here we abstract away from a potential selection effect of entrepreneurs into corruption (Liu, 1985),
because we do not focus on corruption’s allocative impact. In some way, random matching reflects an
inefficient allocation of corruptive government connections among entrepreneurs, which is probability
true in reality due to corruption’s hidden and secretive nature.
In particular, let the measure of entrepreneurs with share s or less who are connected with officials
to be CEt (s). The rest of entrepreneurs with share s or less, N
E(s) − CEt (s), can form relationships
with officials at a probability α ∈ [0, 1]. We assume an official meets at least two entrepreneurs of the
same type at the same time when considering a new relationship. Entrepreneurs compete by offering
a lump-sum payment upfront to the official. The Bertrand competition implies zero expected value of
creating a new relationship for an entrepreneur. After the relationship is established, an entrepreneur
will pay an additional flow fee of bribery every period as long as the official stays in power. The amount
of the bribe will be determined by Nash bargaining.
5Even though the banking sector has market power, we assume bankers in each bank compete with each other so that
they take as given the bank’s marginal return of lending.
6
2.2 Soft-budget Constraints
There are of course many ways to model limited commitment arising from moral hazard. In this paper,
we follow Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Maskin and Xu (2001) to illustrate, without additional
enforcement mechanisms, entrepreneurs shirk in maintaining investment quality, which subjects banks
to soft-budget constraints.
Each period consists of three sub-periods. At the beginning of sub-period one, an entrepreneur is
endowed with a production opportunity that requires one unit of intermediate good. If the opportunity
is funded, the entrepreneur makes a choice at sub-period two on the quality of the project to be high
or to be low. A high-quality project generates output RH at the end of sub-period three. RH is fully
pledgeable, and will be seized by the bank in case the entrepreneur defaults. A low-quality project,
however, requires one unit of additional funding at sub-period two; it generates θRL units of pledgeable
output and (1−θ)RL units of unpledgeable private return at sub-period three. θ ∈ (0, 1) represents its
pledgeability. The private return cannot be observed by banks, shareholders, or government officials,
and therefore will be fully taken by defaulting entrepreneurs.
Assumption 1. RL − r0 < RH , r0 < θRL < 2r0, RH − r0 < (1− θ)RL
RL − r0 < RH ensures the choice of high-quality project to be socially optimal. r0 < θRL makes
sure that banks find it suboptimal to terminate a low-quality project at sub-period two, because the
pledgeable part of the output from a low-quality project is higher than its opportunity cost as one
additional unit of input.6 θRL < 2r0 implies funding low-quality projects generates a loss for banks,
because its pledgeable output is lower than the total amount of funding it requires. Thus, banks keep
funding a low-quality project only because the first unit of input is already sunk, and terminating it
will generate an even bigger loss. The limited commitment thus generates the classic problem of soft
budget constraint (SBC) raised by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
RH−r0 < (1−θ)RL concerns the incentive of entrepreneurs with s = 1. Denote the interest rate at
which banks lend to entrepreneurs to be r. Its spread with banks’ opportunity cost r0, r − r0, reflects
the risk premium associated with lending to entrepreneurs. Due to lax institutions, an entrepreneur
can default without being punished by continuing to borrow from new creditors, so that she makes her
decision based on one-period payoffs only. If she chooses a low-quality project, defaults on the debt,




and runs away, she earns the private return (1−θ)RL. If she chooses a high-quality project and repays
the debt, she retains the residual RH−r. Because RH−r0 < (1−θ)RL and r0 ≤ r, RH−r < (1−θ)RL
must hold. Therefore, the private return of an entrepreneur with s = 1 from choosing a low-quality
project, (1 − θ)RL, exceeds her return from a high-quality project, RH − r. The agency friction thus
leads to a socially inefficient quality choice by an entrepreneur with s = 1. For an entrepreneur with
s < 1, the return from enforcing a high-quality project, s(RH − r), is even smaller, but her private
return from a low-quality project remains (1− θ)RL. Therefore, s(RH − r) < (1− θ)RL holds for all
s ∈ (0, 1]. Apparently, a smaller s associates with a more severe moral-hazard problem.
Under Assumption 1, banks expect all entrepreneurs shall choose low-quality projects, subject
banks to the SBC, default later, and leave with non-performing loans. In this case, banks will be
unwilling to lend due to the SBC, unless there are additional enforcement mechanisms.
2.3 Corruption Enforces Commitment
Due to lax institutions, credit histories are either unobservable or can easily be counterfeited. However,
government officials are powerful enough to grant or terminate entrepreneurs’ access to banks. They
have wide connections that reach every corner of the society, which gives them a collective memory of
entrepreneurs’ credit history as well as extensive capacity to impose punishment. An official, as long
as staying in power, can punish a defaulting entrepreneur either by blocking her chances from faking
a new credit history or by stopping banks from issuing her new loans. Hereby, government officials
become the natural enforcers of financial commitments and the de facto intermediary in the unsecured
loan market. They intermediate funding from banks to entrepreneurs in exchange of bribery.
Specifically, for an entrepreneur with s equity share of her firm, let the end-of-period continuation
value of her relationship with an official to beW (s), and her end-of-period value in case the relationship
terminates to be V (s). Suppose the official charges bribe b(s) when a high-quality project matures.
The entrepreneur has the incentive to choose high-quality projects if and only if
(1− θ)RL + V (s) ≤ s(RH − r)− b(s) +W (s) (2)
The left-hand side of (2) refers to an entrepreneur’s payoff from choosing a low-quality project and
defaulting later; the right-hand side is her payoff from choosing a high-quality project and continuing
the relationship with the official. When the entrepreneur chooses a low-quality project, the official
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terminates the relationship and the entrepreneur is left with V (s) instead of W (s). Thus, W (s)−V (s)
captures the punishment for a defaulting entrepreneur. If this punishment is greater than her short-
run net gain from shirking, (1 − θ)RL − s(RH − r), the relationship with the official can correct an
entrepreneur’s short-term incentive and induce her to repay bank loans in full. In this sense, the net
continuation value of a corrupt relationship,W (s)−V (s), acts as collateral to back the loan repayment.7
As long as the relationship with the corrupt official generates a social surplus by incentivizing the
entrepreneur to choose high-quality projects, the official can share the surplus by charging a bribe,
b(s). The value of b(s) is determined through Nash bargaining. Denote the bargaining power of the
entrepreneur to be γ, b(s) satisfies the following:
b(s) = argmax
b
{s(RH − r)− b+W (s)− [(1− θ)RL + V (s)]}
γ b1−γ (3)
=(1− γ) {[s(RH − r) +W (s)]− [(1− θ)RL + V (s)]}
(3) relates b(s) to the surplus generated by a corrupt relationship that corrects the short-term incentives
of an entrepreneur. It is a fee for the financial intermediation service provided by the official. Together,
(2) and (3) suggest the entrepreneur has the incentive to take high-quality projects, to pay a bribe to
the corrupt official, and to repay bank loans as long as
(1− θ)RL + V (s) ≤ s(RH − r) +W (s) (4)
In other words, as long as the surplus of enforcing a high-quality project is positive, the entrepreneur
and the corrupt official will find an appropriate value for b(s) so that the incentive constraint for the
entrepreneur holds.
2.4 Anti-corruption Investigations
We introduce anti-corruption investigations into the model to allow for disruption of the corruptive
lending. Due to anti-corruption investigations, an official faces a probability κ ∈ [0, 1] of being arrested
and losing power at the beginning of every period. Higher value of κ stands for more intense investiga-
7Here corruption acts like collateral because entrepreneurs will lose the net gain from corruption if she defaults.
However, corruption differs from conventional collateral because, in case of defaults, the conventional collateral value will
be seized by the bank but here banks cannot take W (s)− V (s).
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tions.8 We further assume, once the official gets investigated, the connected entrepreneur will forever
be prohibited from forming a new corruptive relationship with any other officials unless she exits and
re-enters. The continuation value of a corruptive relationship for the entrepreneur, W (s), is
W (s) = βˆ(1− κ) [s(RH − r)− b(s) +W (s)] + βˆκ [(1− θ)RL + V (s)] (5)
where βˆ ≡ β(1 − δ) denotes the effective discount factor including the firm survival rate. βˆ(1 −
κ) [s(RH − r)− b(s) +W (s)] captures the entrepreneur’s payoff from an ongoing relationship, in which
she maintains high-quality projects, bribes the official, and continues as it goes. βˆκ [(1− θ)RL + V (s)]
is an entrepreneur’s payoff if the relationship is terminated by the anti-corruption investigation. Once
the official gets investigated and arrested, the entrepreneur deviates to a low-quality project and reaps
the private return (1 − θ)RL as she anticipates the relationship lending to end. Plugging (3) into (5)
gives
W (s) = βˆ(1− κ)γ [s(RH − r) +W (s)]
+ βˆ [1− (1− κ)γ] [(1− θ)RL + V (s)] .
Under Condition (4), the value for the entrepreneur increases in her bargaining power γ and de-
creases in the intensity of the anticorruption investigation κ. Higher γ raises the share of the surplus
allocated to the entrepreneur; higher κ shortens the expected duration of a corruptive relationship.
The interest rate r charged by banks includes a premium associated with possible defaults induced
by the soft-budget constraint. For simplicity, here we assume banks have little bargaining power over
the official, so that the value of r leaves banks indifferent between lending through the corrupt official
and taking the outside option G that yields a return of r0. In the event of the official being investigated
with probability κ, the bank funds one more unit to the low-quality project due to the SBC, makes the
total amount of lending to be two, and scraps a value of θRL. With probability 1− κ of the official’s
staying in power, no more loan is required and the return to the high-quality project chosen by the
entrepreneur is r. Therefore, the expected loan size is (1 + κ). The break-even condition for banks to
8To keep the model simple, we do not consider additional penalties faced by the corrupt officials after the investigation
other than losing briberies.
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stay indifferent between the safe outside storage option and lending through the official is
(1 + κ)r0 = κθRL + (1− κ)r. (6)
We can then derive the required return on a corruption-backed loan to be
r =
(1 + κ)r0 − κθRL
1− κ
. (7)
The spread between the return rate to a corruption-backed loan and that to the safe-storage technology,
r−r0, is increasing in anti-corruption intensity κ. Banks charge a higher risk premium when κ is higher.
2.5 Alternative Financing
Now we introduce alternative financing options for the purpose of illustrating the substitution between
corruption and more conventional collateral. Alternative financing options can be loans backed by
physical assets, loans pledged with equity shares, or corporate-bond issuance. Here we model a a
financing tool of particular relevance for our empirical investigations – loans backed by an entrepreneur’s
equity shares termed the Share Pledge Finance (SPF). In an economy with poor institutions, physical
collateral can be difficult to keep track of, but the ownership and the market value of a publicly listed
firm’s equity shares are much easier to verify.
Although the SPF relaxes the borrowing constraint of a share holder, the agency friction between
the pledging shareholder and other shareholders is still a concern. Thus borrowing with SPF is costly
just as with other forms of collateral. Denote the monitoring cost per unit of loan to be ξ and again
assume competitive banks retains no surplus. Then the interest rate at which entrepreneurs borrow
through SPF is rp =r0 + ξ.
9 If SPF is feasible for an entrepreneur with s equity share, the value for
the entrepreneur from SPF is:10




We study the condition under which the SPF incentivizes an entrepreneur to undertake high-quality
9In China, when the interest rate on bank loans is around 4-5%, the interest rate on SPF could be as high as 8-9%.
10Here, we simplify the value function without including the future value from being randomly matched with a new
corrupt official as, due to the competition for government officials among entrepreneurs, the expected entry value into
corruption is zero.
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projects. Defaulting on a loan with SPF would reduce an entrepreneur’s shares, driving her to reap
private returns from low-quality projects. Thus, her incentive constraint is




In this case, the equity share of an entrepreneur becomes the collateral she would lose in case of
defaults. Apparently, (8) holds only for entrepreneurs whose shares are high enough. This requirement
on shareholding is consistent with the observed high haircuts on loans with SPF. The punishment from
losing equity collateral is more severe if the default leads to a sufficiently high loss of equity shares for
the entrepreneur. This imposes a lower bound on the haircut from pledging equity as collateral.
s ≥ sE =
(1− βˆ)(1− θ)RL
RH − r0 − ξ
. (9)
Entrepreneurs with s ≤ sE is unable to borrow against their equity shares. sE is increasing in r0 and
ξ, indicating the measure of entrepreneurs who can borrow against their equity share is decreasing in





s(RH − r0 − ξ)I(s ≥ s
E). (10)
Due to lax institutions it costly to monitor collateralized loans, entrepreneurs hence may prefer rela-
tionship loans through corrupted officials to collateralized loans. This condition will be derived later.
They only switch to collateralized loans when they lose access to corruption backed finance as related
officials are investigated. If SPF is the only alternative source of funding, an entrepreneur with share
holding less than sE will default in case the anti-corruption investigation instigates her connected of-
ficial, and will forever lose her access to the financial market so that her firm may become a dormant,
zombie firm.
2.6 Equilibrium
Before we characterize the equilibrium, a few lemmas should be given and several further assumptions
should be made.
Lemma 1. With the value of ξ approaching RH −G
′(K), only entrepreneurs with equity shares large
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enough can borrow, and they borrow through corruption as long as




where r is determined by (7).
Lemma 1 posits corruption will become the only tool for finance when the monitoring cost of SPF
is too high. G′(K) is the lowest possible value for r0. When ξ approaches RH − G
′(K), the value of
borrowing through SPF would be too low for SPF to be profitable. In that case, only entrepreneurs
with equity shares above (11) can overcome the moral-hazard problem and borrow through corruption;
those with s below this threshold cannot borrow at all. Higher κ raises this threshold by implying
greater risks associated with corruption.
Now we focus on the case when ξ is of appropriate value, so that entrepreneurs have potential
access to both corruption and SPF. To focus on the substitution effect between corruption and SPF,
we assume all entrepreneurs can borrow with SPF:
Assumption 2. The value of ξ and s is such that s ≥ sE for all entrepreneurs.
For Assumption 2 to hold, ξ must be of appropriate value for SPF to be profitable. We further
assume firms are aware of the moral hazard associated with s so that all entrepreneurs hold enough
equity shares to access SPF. In this case, two conditions are required for an entrepreneur to choose
corruption over SPF. First, the surplus from corruption must be positive: (1− θ)RL+V (s) ≤ s(RH −
r)+W (s). Second, the value of utilizing corruption-backed finance must exceed that of using the SPF:
V (s) ≤W (s). The precise implications of the two conditions are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 2, entrepreneurs with connections to officials utilize corruption for
finance if and only if their equity shares meet the following condition:
s ≥ sC ≡
(1− θ)RL





where r is determined by (7).
Lemma 2 suggests the followings. Higher ξ lowers the threshold sC : with higher cost of monitoring
SPF, entrepreneurs are more likely to utilize corruption. Higher κ, however, raises sC : with greater
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risks associated with corruption, required risk premium for corruption-backed lending increases, so that
fewer entrepreneurs can undertake corruption for borrowing.
The equilibrium measure of entrepreneurs connected with corrupt officials is determined by new
relationship formation as well as exit induced by the anti-corruption investigation. The law of motion







I(s > sCt )− (κ+ δ)C
E
t (s). (13)
Let CE(s) to denote the steady-state measure of entrepreneurs borrowing through corruption with
equity shares smaller or equal to s. At the steady state,
CE(s) =
α





In each period, a fraction κ of corruption-backed loans are disrupted, causing entrepreneurs to under-
take low-quality projects and forcing banks to lend one more unit of loan resources for each of these
projects due to the SBC. Therefore, the expected amount of loans taken by an average project initially
financed through corruption is 1 − κ + 2κ = 1 + κ, and the total amount of loans allocated through
corruption at period t is KCt = C
E










(14) suggests intensified anti-corruption investigations, captured by higher κ, induces a direct and
an indirect effects on the total amount of loans issued through corruption. On the one hand, higher
κ increases KC : more entrepreneurs plan on defaulting by choosing low-quality projects, which forces
banks to issue additional loans due to the SBC, so that KC rises. This effect is direct. On the other
hand, higher κ causes more exit and discourages entry by raising sC , so that KC declines. This effect
is indirect, and takes place with further dynamics in entry and exit. When κ rises suddenly due to the
initiation of the national anti-corruption campaign, it is the direct effect that takes place right away.
Since we analyze the steady-state equilibrium only, we make the following assumption to make sure
the implications of our comparative-static exercises with higher κ are similar to changes in KC during
the transitionary dynamics:
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Assumption 3. Intermediate inputs occupied by corruption, KC , increases in the anti-corruption
intensity κ.
Assumption 3 ensures the direct effect of higher κ dominates: additional loan resources required
by more low-quality projects is greater than the decline in the measure of entrepreneurs undertaking
corruption for finance. It is meant to capture the on-impact effect of the anti-corruption campaign on
non-performing loans.
The equilibrium measure of entrepreneurs who use SPF equals the total amount of loans issued
through SPF, KEt . At the steady state,
KE = KEt = 1−
α





To ensure that the equilibrium is well defined, we assume that the total supply of loan resources is
large enough:
Assumption 4. K ≥ 1 + κ.
1 + κ is the possibly largest demand for loans: every entrepreneur borrow through corruption
and κ fraction requires additional loan resources. Assumption 4 ensures the total loan demand by
entrepreneurs is always weakly less than the total supply, so that loan resources allocated to safe-
storage technology is nonzero: KS ≥ 0.
Definition 1. Given the anti-corruption intensity κ, a stationary equilibrium consists of the return
rate on safe loans, r0, the return rate on corruption-backed loans, r, the amount of intermediate
inputs allocated to safe storage, KS , to the corruption lending, KC , and to the SPF lending, KE , the
participation threshold for the corruption borrowing, sC , and that for the SPF borrowing, sE , such
that the required return rate on safe loans, r0, clears the loan market:
K = KS +KC +KE .
Moreover, r0 is determined by (1), r by (7), K
C by (14), sC by (12), sE by (9), and KE by (15).
The following proposition characterizes the conditions for the existence of a unique stationary
equilibrium: it exists when the alternative form of finance is costly, agents are patient enough, and the
anti-corruption investigation is not too intensive.
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Proposition 1. For ξ > ξ, β > β and κ < κ and under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, there exists a unique
equilibrium where corruption-backed finance is active, entrepreneurs with both connections to officials
and access to SFP, choose corruption-backed finance if the entrepreneur’s share holding satisfies (12).
The proof is presented in the appendix. Proposition 1, together with Lemma 1, highlights the
implications of institutional frictions on borrowing and lending. In our model, this is captured by the
monitoring cost ξ. When this cost is too high, conventional financing channels are turned off completely
(Lemma 1). When this cost is sufficiently low, corruption-backed finance may be in-conesequential as
in some developed economies. When this cost remains at an intermediate range, both conventional and
unconventional financing channels stay active, acting as imperfect substitutes for facilitating economic
development.
The next proposition summaries our model’s key predictions to be taken to data for empirical
investigations:
Proposition 2. In an equilibrium with all financing channels active, under assumption 3, intensifying
anti-corruption investigations by raising κ causes the return on safe investments, r0, to rise and:
1. firm connected with the investigated officials will default, and the amount of non-performing loans
will rise.
2. firms connected with the investigated officials will pledge more equity shares for borrowing, their
defaults will appear strategic, and their equity value will decline on impact.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Proposition 2 summarizes two sets of predictions capturing how
intensified anti-corruption investigations impact the equilibrium outcome. The first set predicts that,
when an corrupt official gets investigated, his corruptive relationships with entrepreneurs terminate so
that entrepreneurs default on previous, corruption-backed loans; consequently, non-performing loans
rise. The intuition is straightforward: the financial commitments enforced by the corrupt official is
broken by his arrest, and entrepreneurs default.
However, alternative theories on corruption can also generate the first set of predictions of Proposi-
tion 2. In the stories captured by Chen and Kung (2018) and Fang et al. (2018), corrupt officials offer
resources like land contracts with favorable pricing or substantial subsidies to their connected firms
in exchange of bribes; when these officials get investigated, the connected firms will likely default on
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some of the existent loans because losing resources can limit their debt-payment capacity. Therefore,
the positive relationship between defaults, non-performing loans and the anti-corruption investiga-
tions, although consistent with our theory, does not necessarily prove corruption’s role as financial
intermediation.
The second set of predictions of Proposition 2 point to a substitution effect: under Assumption
2, defaulting entrepreneurs substitute corruption with SPF for further borrowing, so that their firms’
operations remain unaffected and their defaults appear strategic. These firms’ equity value drops on
impact because SPF is more costly: the entrepreneurs chose corruption over SPF because V (s) ≤W (s).
Moreover, higher κ causes r0 = G
′(KS) to rise, because funding held up in non-performing loans
squeezes out KS . Higher r0 reduces V (s) by raising rp = r0+ ξ, which contributes to a further decline
in firms’ equity value.
The prediction on strategic default is unique to our proposed role of corruption as financial in-
termediation. In alternative corruption theories, firms may default with the arrest of the connected
officials, but their defaults must accompany deteriorations in performance or financial status. These
firms would have no reasons to suddenly default on existent loans if their business is somehow not
at all affected by the arrest of the official, unless the official had played a key role in getting those
loans. By contrast, firms in our theory default because the arrest of the official breaks the commitment
mechanism, regardless of how the anti-corruption investigation impacts firm performance. Whether
such defaults appear strategic is conditional on whether these firms can access other financing tools
for further resources.
For simplicity, we model SPF as the only alternative financing tool to corruption. But firms can
substitute corruption with many other tools for defaults to appear strategic. They can borrow against
physical collateral for example. With poor institutions, physical assets are usually hard to verify, and
must be another inferior alternative. For similar reasons, corporate bond issuance can be another
inferior alternative. When ξ is sufficiently high, as Lemma 1 predicts, all alternative financing tools
would shut down completely, leaving corruption the only option for finance.
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3 Data
Now we turn to data to investigate the empirical relevance of corruption for finance. For two reasons,
we choose to examine data from China, although we believe corruption is utilized for finance in many
countries. In 2013, the Chinese president initiated a national anti-corruption campaign that lasted until
today. This campaign has generated significant increases in the number of investigations and arrests,
resulting in rich data variations to test our predictions. Moreover, the central bank of China has
implemented significant financial institutional reforms to activate more financing tools. This provides
an ideal institutional background for identifying the substitution effect between corruption and other
financial tools as a key component of our theory’s predictions.
We look for two types of data in particular: data on the intensity of anti-corruption investigations
or on the identifications of firms implicated by the investigations; and data on financial indicators,
especially on firm defaults and on non-performing loans. We compile such data from China at the
regional level and at the firm level.
3.1 Regional Data
Our regional panel covers 30 Chinese provinces (excluding Tibet) from 2000 to 2015. We focus on two
regional indicators.
The first indicator measures regional anti-corruption intensity as the number of officials newly put
under investigation for corruption - namely - the “Shuang Gui” officials. This information is published
by the 2001-2016 Procuratorial Yearbooks of China.11 We only consider the arrests of “Shuang Gui”
officials with bureaucratic ranks at or above the county or division administration level (“Chu Ji”).
In principle, this indicator reflects either the amount of regional on-going corruptive activities or the
intensity of local anti-corruption investigations. For two reasons, we believe it is changes in the latter
rather than in the former that drive variations in this number in China. Firstly, corrupt officials are
usually arrested for corruptive activities performed many years ago; Guo (2008) reports the time lag
between the year of the occurrence of corruptive activities and the year of their formal investigation to
be as long as 5-8 years in China. Secondly, during national anti-corruption campaigns local governors
usually make a specific effort to arrest more corrupt officials, because this is a time point when the
11Procuratorial Yearbooks of China publish statistics of the previous year. For example, the 2001 year book reports
activities occurring up until 2000.
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central government views increased enforcement figures as an important political achievement and an
indication of commitment to the party leader. As shown by Figure 1, the number of arrests jumps up
sharply at 2013, the year of the initiation of the campaign. It is unlikely that the amount of corruptive
activities increased by so much so quickly, especially at a time point right after the Chinese president
made an announcement to fight corruption.
The second indicator measures the amount of regional non-performing loans. We compile this data
from the 2006-2015 China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Reports. Non-performing loans
are defined as the sum of outstanding “sublime loans”, “dubious loans”, and “damaged loans” held by
all financial institutions by the end of the year. A loan is considered “sublime” as long as the borrower
has displayed incapacity to make loan payments and the lender expects to recover 50%-70% of the
principle; it is considered “dubious” if the lender expects to recover 25% -50% of the principle; it is
considered “damaged” if less than 25% of the principle is expected to be recovered. Our data on regional
non-performing loans include those borrowed by firms, by all institutions, and by households. Ideally,
we would like to have data on non-performing loans borrowed by firms only; unfortunately this data
is not available at the regional level. Nonetheless, the 2015 China Banking Regulatory Commission
Report documents over 90% of total non-performing loans in China were initially borrowed by firms.
Hereby, we use the amount of total non-performing loans to approximate those by firms.
Additionally, we obtain data on regional real GDP growth from the China Statistical Yearbooks.
Real GDP growth is calculated as the annual growth in GDP index measured in fixed prices. We us
this indicator to control for regional economic activities.
3.2 Firm-level Data
We put together a quarterly panel of 3438 non-financial firms publicly listed in the Shanghai or
Shengzhen Stock Exchanges from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2017. We choose to
examine publicly listed firms, because detailed information on their performance and financial status
are publicized on a regular base and because they are usually well connected and can access multiple
financial tools. Information on firm characteristics, including age, size, and ownership types, and on
firm financial status, such as the asset level, cash holdings, and leverage ratio, are from the China
Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). This database is considered the Chinese
equivalent of the Compustat in the U.S.. The full sample size is 100162. This panel is unbalanced, as
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not all firms were present for the entire sample period.
Two data series in this panel are collected on our own. Official records on firm defaults are gathered
based on the announcements by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Firms implicated by the anti-
corruption investigations, together with the timing of their first implications, are identified according
to information publicized by China’s Central Commission Discipline Inspection as well as information
reported by news media.
Firm Defaults The Supreme Court of China continually publicizes a list of defaulting firms, called
“Shi Xin” firms, together with their specific dates of defaults. The defaulting dates are the days when
these firms or some of their branches were ruled by the local court as having failed to fulfill their debt
responsibilities. We match this list with our quarterly panel according to firm name, location, and
ownership information. In particular, we create a dummy variable Sit that equals one if firm i or one of
its branches is announced by the court to have defaulted at least once in quarter t, and zero otherwise.
This way we are able to identify 437 public firms with 695 records of defaults from 2007 to 2017.
Anti-corruption Implications We identify firms implicated by anti-corruption investigations as
follows. Firstly, we collect a sample of corrupt officials based on publicized information on corruption
investigation cases. China’s Central Commission of Discipline Inspection continually reports the names
and the titles of corrupt officials as well as the specific dates when their investigation cases for corruption
were established. Here we restrict our attention to officials at or above the deputy-minister level at
the central government or the deputy-governor level at the provincial government, as we believe only
higher-level officials can effectively enforce debt commitments.
Secondly, we search for public firms financially linked with the arrested corrupt officials by utilizing
Baidu, Yahoo, Bing, and Google search engines. In particular, we apply a search algorithm to collect
all the news involving any publicly listed firms as well as the exact names and/or the job titles of
any corrupt officials in our sample. Then we manually check each pieces of news, to exclude those
reporting activities involving no financial or economic transactions (for example, news saying that the
prime minister paid a visit to a factory), and to keep those reporting business transactions (for example,
news saying the governor helped a firm to get a loan). The remaining sample yields 128 public firms
implicated by anti-corruption investigations that were established at various time points, ranging from
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the second quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2017. 12
Based on information obtained as above, we are able to create a dummy variable Cit that equals
one if, in quarter t, China’s Central Commission of Discipline Inspection formally establishes an inves-
tigation case of an official who has been financially linked with firm i, and zero otherwise.
3.3 Measurements, Trends, and Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the regional sample statistics for 30 provinces. Panel A reports statistics in levels.
From 2000 to 2015, each province reports an average of 95 officials at or above the county or division
administration level newly put under formal investigations for corruption every year. The sample
on regional non-performing loans covers the years from 2006 to 2015: the amount of regional non-
performing loans averages 23.4 billion RMB. Panel B reports statistics in annual growths. From 2000
to 2015, regional “Shuang Gui” officials grew by 9.7% annually, and real GDP grew by 11.6%; from
2006 to 2015, non-performing loans grew by 8.7% annually.
Table 2 summarizes the firm-level data statistics. Age is defined as the number of years between the
year of firms’ registration to the present. The leverage ratio is the ratio of total debts over total assets.
Real assets and real fixed assets are calculated by deflating the value of total assets and fixed assets
with the provincial fixed-investment price index published by China’s Statistical Year books. Cash is
the end-of-the-quarter outstanding level of cash and cash equivalents. Long Loan is the outstanding
value of loans borrowed from banks or financial institutions with terms over a year; Short Loan is the
value of borrowings with terms within a year.13 We examine two types of financing tools: pledged
stock is a quantity measure, as the number of stock shares pledged for borrowing; bonds are the sum
of the outstanding principle and interest value of company-issued bonds. All variables are winsorized
between 1% and 99%.
According to Panels A and B of Table 2, an average publicly listed firm in our sample is fairly large:
it employs 5571 workers, ages 15.4 years, and displays a leverage ratio of 0.45. It has quarterly sales
of 3.47 billion RMB, quarterly profit of 0.26 billion RMB, and cash holdings of 1.31 billion RMB. It
holds real assets of 6.8 billion and real fixed assets of 1.6 billion RMB. It carries short-term loans of
12Li, Wang, and Zhou (2018) examine corruption cases established since 2012 and were able to identify 61 implicated
firms. If we also restrict our search to cases after 2012, then we get 69 implicated firms. The difference in the sample
size between our search and theirs may arise from permanent deletion of some old news or more recent news disclosures.
13The CSMAR database does not specify if short-term loan is borrowed from banks/financial institutions or from other
firms/individuals or both.
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0.99 billion and long-term loans of 1.03 billion RMB. It has pledged 0.12 billion shares of stocks and
issued corporate bonds of 0.37 billion RMB.
We apply a measure from Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) to address two data concerns in our sample.
Firstly, firm-level variables in China are often non-stationary when measured in levels or log levels,
because China experienced extensive institutional reforms as well as frequent policy changes during
our sample period. For example, in 2008 China implemented the biggest stimulus packages at the
time around the world, causing asset prices to change dramatically in the following years (Ouyang
and Peng, 2015). This suggests that we should examine variables measured in growths rather than in
levels. Secondly, the conventional growth measures or log-first-difference measures may bias the results
by generating value of infinities, because many firm-level variables contain significant number of zero
value: for example, the variable “pledged stock” often equals zero, as many firms pledged some equity
shares at some point, stopped pledging equity shares for many quarters, and started to pledge equity







(16) measures quarterly annual growth as growth from the same quarter of the last year, which
removes any existent seasonalities. Moreover, value of variables measured by (16) stays strictly within
[−2, 2] as long as Yit is non-negative, and thus avoids the value of infinities.
14
Firm Statistics calculated based on (16) are reported in Panel C of Table 2: from the first quarter
of 2007 to the last quarter of 2017, annual growth rate for an average firm is around 12% for most
variables: sales, profits, real assets, real fixed assets, and short-term and long-term loans. For cash
holdings, the average annual growth is 7%; for pledged stock and for corporate bonds, the annual
growth is around 30%.
4 Non-performing Loans and Firm Defaults
With the regional panel and the firm panel, we test our theory’s key predictions captured by Proposition
2. The first null to test is that intensified anti-corruption investigations cause non-performing loans to
14In Panel C of Table 2, the quarterly annual growth of profit ranges from −0.12 to 12.79 because profit can be
negative. Nonetheless, it avoids the value of infinities. When calculating the growth rates of profits based on (16), we
take the absolute value of the denominator of (16).
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rise, and firms connected with the investigated officials will default accordingly.
4.1 Regional Non-performing Loans
Figure 2 plots the time series of the average value of regional non-performing loans against the average
number of “Shuang Gui” officials across 30 provinces. The former reflects the amount of defaults
occurring within an average province. The latter indicates local anti-corruption intensity. The two
series should be positively correlated under the null. As shown by Figure 2, both series jump sharply
starting from 2013, the year when the national anti-corruption campaign initiated: the average number
of regional “Shang Gui” officials rose from 96 in 2013 to 127 in 2014 (a 32% increase) and to 143 officials
in 2015 (a further 12.5% increase); meanwhile, the average amount of regional non-performing loans
rose from 18.2 billion RMB in 2013 to 26.6 billion RMB in 2014 (a 46% increase), and to 40.3 billion
RMB in 2015 (a further 51.5% increase). The correlation coefficients of the two series is 0.08 before
2008, and 0.96 afterward.
However, time-series plots can only be suggestive whether our theory is consistent with the data.
Many other factors can generate or mask existent data patterns. For example, in Figure 2 the amount
of non-performing loans declines steadily and sharply between 2005 and 2010, while the number of
“Shuang Gui” officials appears relatively stable. This is because since the early 2000s the Chinese
government made a successful effort to reduce the large amount of bad loans arising during the 1998
Asia Financial Crisis.15 These strong dynamics can easily cover the positive correlation between the
amount of non-performing loans and the number of “Shuang Gui” officials potentially present in the
early 2000s. For similar reasons, the seemingly strong correlation between the two series post 2008 can
be driven by certain latent common factors.
To test the null formally, we run an OLS regression with the regional panel. This allows us to control
for some of the aggregate and regional factors. In particular, we test the following specification:
Nit = αi + L(γ)Cit + βXit + ǫit (17)
Nit is the amount of non-performing loans for region i in year t. αi is a regional dummy. L(γ) is a
lag polynomial, Cit is the anti-corruption indicator as the number of “Shuang Gui” officials. Xit is
15Some remaining bad loans were further eliminated by the debt rollover when the 2008 Stimulus Package was imple-
mented (Chen et al., 2019)
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a set of controls including year dummies and regional real GDP. ǫit is an error term. All variables
except the dummies are measured in log-first differences (growth rates). The parameter of interest
is γ, reflecting the relationship between non-performing loans and the anti-corruption intensity. The
regional fixed effect presumably captures the cross-region variations due to long-term economic factors
such as culture, industry mix, transportation cost, labor force composition, and etc. Year dummies
are to control for the influences of aggregate economic factors such as national fiscal policies, monetary
policies, or variations in aggregate economic environment such as the global financial crises. Regional
real GDP are to control for other local economic factors. We experiment with various lag lengths as
well as with or without controls to check the robustness of our results.
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results of (17). Without controlling for the year dummies or
regional GDP, a 10% increase in the number of “Shuang Gui” officials is associated with a contempora-
neous increase of about 4% in non-performing loans, a cumulative one-year increase of about 9%, and
a cumulative two-year increase of about 12%; all three estimates are significant at the 1% level. After
controlling for the year dummies and the regional GDP, the estimated γ’s remain positive, but with
reduced point estimates. In particular, a 10% increase in the number of “Shuang Gui” officials is asso-
ciated with an increase in regional non-performing loans of 1% contemporaneously, 2% cumulatively
in one year, and 2.3% cumulatively in two years. All estimates on γ stay statistically significant at the
10% level or higher. Also, the estimated coefficients on regional GDP are all negative, consistent with
the common belief that non-performing loans rise when local economies turn bad.
The results reported in Table 3 suggest regional non-performing loans are positively related to local
anti-corruption intensities, which supports the null and remains robust after controlling for aggregate
and local economic factors. However, there are two limitations in applying the regional data to test
the null.
Firstly, variations in Cit, the measured anti-corruption intensity, cannot be fully exogenous. A
positive estimate on γ may not reflect the causality running from Cit to Nit, but can be driven by latent
factors causing Cit and Nit to co-move. Local economic performance can be one of these factors: bad
economic performance raises non-performing loans and attracts the attention of the central government
who pushes local prosecutors to investigate harder, causing more corrupt officials to be arrested. Hereby,
regional economic performance creates an upper bias on the estimate for γ; controlling for local GDP
corrects for but may not fully eliminate this bias. Also, in 2014 the Chinese government initiated a
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plan of “capacity reduction" for heavy-supply industries; officials working in target industries get a lot
of investigations. At the same time, firms in these industries experience great difficulty in obtaining
new loans, and become more likely to default on existent loans (Chang et al., 2016). In this case, Cit
to Nit rise together for target industries, also generating an upper bias on γ.
Secondly, testing our theory with regional data lacks test power: alternative mechanisms of corrup-
tion can generate a positive estimate on γ as well. In our theory, corrupt officials enforce loan payments;
the anti-corruption investigation breaks the commitment so that firms default. Hence, intensified in-
vestigation arrests more officials, driving more firms to default; consequently, non-performing loans
rise. In an alternative theory of corruption, an official exercises power to allocate resources directly
under his control – such as tax credit or business permits – to firms in exchange for bribery. If this
official gets investigated, his connected firms will lose these resources, which harms firm performance,
constrains firms’ debt-payment capacity, and drives firms to default. Intensified investigations arrest
more officials, constrain more firms’ debt-payment capacity, and cause non-performing loans to rise
with more defaulting firms. Therefore, higher Cit can raise Nit even if corruption never function as
financial intermediation.
4.2 Firm Defaults
To identify the true causality running from the anti-corruption investigations to defaults, we investigate
more detailed firm-level data by performing the following difference-in-difference (DID) estimations:
Sit = αi + αt + γPit + βXit + ǫit (18)
Sit is a default dummy for firm i in quarter t, it equals one if in quarter t firm i or one of its
branches defaults at least once. αi and αt are firm and quarter-year fixed effects. ǫit is an error term.
Pit is a dummy that equals one if an official connected with firm i had been under investigation for
corruption on or before quarter t, and equals zero if the investigation has not yet taken place or will
never occur. This is a DID estimation with variations in treatment timing (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003). The treated firms are the firms identified to be implicated by the anti-corruption investigation.
The staggered occurrence of the corruption cases implies that the corresponding control firms are not
restricted to firms never implicated. In fact, Equation (18) takes as a control group all firms that have
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not yet been implicated by quarter t even if some will be later. γ is the parameter of interest, capturing
the impact of the anti-corruption investigation implication on firm default probability.
In (18), Xit are a set of controls including firm size, the leverage ratio, and real asset growth. More-
over, we include additional province-specific, industry-specific time trends to control for the potential
impact of any other policy reforms over the sample period. Firm size is measured as the number of
employees in log levels. All other variables except for the leverage ratio and the dummies are measured
in quarterly annual growth based on (16). We experiment with and without controlling for firm size,
for real asset growth, and for the leverage ratio. All specifications include the standard quarter-by-year
and firm fixed effects for the DID estimation.
Our findings are summarized in Table 4. Column (1) displays the result of a basic linear probability
specification. We find that default probability is about 0.7% higher among the implicated firms after
their being implicated. Since the average default probability is 0.69% per quarter in our sample, this
suggests default probability doubles after being implicated by the anti-corruption investigation. In
Columns (2) -(4), we account for several firm characteristics that may be correlated with the fact of
being implicated by the anti-corruption investigation. As expected, bigger, larger real-asset-growth,
and lower-leverage firms are less likely to default. Accounting for these additional but likely endogenous
controls, however, does not change the result that being implicated by the anti-corruption investigation
raises default probability by at least 0.6%. All estimates are significant statistically at the 5% level or
above.
We further investigate issues of reverse causality that may bias our results. As explained earlier, an
industry aimed by the government to reduce excessive capacity experience great difficulty in obtaining
new loans, and thus more likely to default; meanwhile, government officials taking charge of this
industry get plenty of investigations. Likewise, firms located in a province experiencing an economic
contraction will default more frequently, which attracts the attention of the investigation agency and
causes more local officials to be investigated. Although such possible biases are minimized in our
regression by controlling for industry-by-year and province-by-year fixed effects, an alternative way,
however, to address reverse causality issues is to examine the dynamic effect of the anti-corruption
investigation implication on defaults.
In practice, in column (5) we replace the single Dit dummy with four dummy variables to track the
effect of the anti-corruption investigation “before” and “after” the implication: before−2 and before−1
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are dummy variables that equal one for a firm implicated by the anti-corruption investigation two
quarters and one quarter prior to the implication, before0 equals one for an implicated firm in that first
quarter of being implicated, after1 equals one for an implicate firm that was implicated last quarter,
and after2+ equals one for an implicated firm that was implicated at least two quarters ago. Before−2
and before−1 allow us to assess whether any increased tendency to default can be found prior to the
implication of the anti-corruption investigation. Finding such an “effect” could be a sign of some
reverse causality. In fact, we find the estimated coefficient on the before−2 and before−1 dummies both
to be statistically insignificant; the estimated coefficient on before−1 is even negative. This suggests
these implicated firms showed no prior trend of defaulting more than their peers. The estimated
effect of the anti-corruption investigation in the quarter of the implication, before0, is still statistically
insignificant, probably because it takes several months for the court to reach a ruling on a default. The
estimated effect rises to 2.2% one quarter after the implication, and remains positive afterward. This
is consistent with a causal interpretation of our basic result that a firm is more likely to default after
being implicated.
We also check the sensitivity of this result to alternative probability estimation models. Column
(6) uses a probit model and finds similar evidence of an increase in default probability following the
implication. A logit model delivers similar result that are not reported here.
5 Strategic Defaults
Now we investigate the power of the test of our theory, examining whether our identified defaults
caused by anti-corruption implications can differentiate our theory from alternatives. As explained
earlier, the anti-corruption investigation can hurt an implicated firm in many ways. In an alternative
theory of corruption, an official offers resources directly under his control – such as subsidies or exclusive
contracts with favorable pricing – to his connected firms in exchange of bribery. When this official
gets arrested, his connected firms experience declines in sales, profits, or cash flows by losing resources,
which limits firms’ capacity to pay debts; as a result, default probability rises even if the official never
assisted any of these firms in finance. Therefore, the mere finding that the anti-corruption investigation
raises defaults cannot differentiate our theory from alternative corruption theories or, put differently,
it lacks test power.
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Nonetheless, Proposition 2 gives an unique prediction: firms default strategically following the anti-
corruption investigation, as long as the other financing channels are active. That is to say, these firms
have the capacity to turn to alternative channels for finance, so that neither their performance nor
their financial status are severely impacted after the official loses power. They choose to default on
previous, corruption-backed loans, not because they do not have the capacity to pay, but because the
arrest of the official breaks the commitment. This prediction is unique to our theory on corruption as
a commitment-enforcement mechanism.
In this section, we test the second set of predictions of Proposition 2 based on our sample of publicly
listed firms. As shown by the summary statistics reported in Table 2, our sample firms are big and
financially strong. In China, publicly listed firms are usually well connected with access to various
financing tools, and are most capable of defaulting strategically. In reality, however, there are many
small, private firms that probably have corruption as their only tool for finance. After their being
implicated by the anti-corruption investigation, these firms may leave the market once and for all.
We purposefully choose not to examine these firms, not only because their data are not as detailed,
but also because their lack of capacity for strategic default cannot help differentiate our theory from
alternatives.
5.1 Defaults are Strategic
To investigate if our identified defaults are indeed strategic, we estimate how the anti-corruption
investigations influence firm performance and financial status, again by exercising a DID estimation:
Yit = αi + αt + γPit + βXit + ǫit (19)
Firm Performance We let Yit in (19) to be gross profit, net profit, gross sales, net sales, and cash
holdings. “Gross" sales or profits calculate the totals of all inflows, while “net" sales or profits consider
those from operations only. Pit is the same DID dummy for the anti-corruption implication as in (18).
Xit are a set of control variables: firm size as the number of employees in log levels, real asset growth,
and the leverage ratios. We run DID estimations for each of these performance variables. As usual, all
specifications include firm fixed effects, quarter-by-year fixed effects, and additional province-specific,
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industry-specific time trends; and all dependent variables are measured as quarterly annual growths.16
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. We find the anti-corruption investigations have
negligible influence on most of the performance measures: the four estimated coefficients on the impli-
cation dummy for gross sales, net sales, gross profits, and net profits are all statistically insignificant.
Cash holdings, however, are estimated to rise by 3.07% after a firm becomes implicated. Apparently,
none of these results suggest firm performance deteriorates after the arrest of firms’ connected official;
as a matter of fact, these firms’ cash holdings appear improved.
We further investigate two sets of accounting variables to explore whether the anti-corruption
implications restrain firms’ financial capacity.
Firms’ Ability to Pay Debts The first set of accounting variables measure firms’ ability to pay
debts, consisting of five indicators all calculated as fractions of liquid liabilities: Current Rate measures
the value of liquid assets; Quick Rate the value of liquid assets net of inventory; Super Quick Rate
the value of the sum of cash, short-term securities, and and receivables; Cash Rate 1 the value of net
cash flows; and Cash Rate 2 the value of net cash flows from operations only. Higher value of these
measures imply more sufficient liquidity to make debt payments. We let Yit to be each of these five
indicators and run DID regressions of (19) one by one.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. Maybe surprisingly, we find implicated firms’ ability
to pay debts appears stronger after their being implicated: four out of the five estimated coefficients
on the implication dummy are positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with
the estimated increase in cash holdings reported in Table 5, implying implicated firms somehow seem
to hold more cash or liquid assets relative to their liquid liabilities.
Of course, the fact of being implicated itself cannot give firms more cash or strengthen their debt-
payment abilities, since the anti-corruption investigation undoubtedly serves as an adverse shock at
least in the short run. We interpret the increase in cash holdings to be an endogenous response, as
firms make a specific effort to hedge against risks arising from the anti-corruption implication. Similar
results have been reported by Ma et al. (2019), who find Chinese firms hold more cash once exposed
to external risks, and by Gao and Xu (2018), who document U.S. firms accumulate more cash during
16The results in this subsection are based on measurements of the dependent variables calculated following Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992). However, alternative measures as log-first difference would generate similar results as long as the
performance variable does not contain frequent zero values.
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recessions. Also note that Cash Rate 2, the measure that excludes cash flows from finance, is the
only indicator estimated not to rise following the implication. This suggests the extra cash may come
through alternative finance.
Firms’ Ability to Keep Loans in Good Standing The second set of accounting variables consist
of four indicators that measure firms’ ability to keep loans in good standing: liquidity-loan ratio equals
the ratio of liquid asset net of liquid liability over total loans; profit-over-financial-cost ratio is the
ratio of net profit over total financial cost; cash-over-financial-cost ratio equals the ratio of net cash
inflows from operations only over total financial cost; and cash-over-urgent-debt ratio the ratio of net
cash inflows from operations over total debts due within a year. Higher value of these measures imply
stronger ability to make loan payments. Again we run DID regressions of (19) one by one, letting Yit
to be each of the four indicators in each regression.
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. Again, our estimates suggest that, firms’ ability
to keep loans in good standing does not weaken after the implication, if not improves. Out of the
four estimates on the coefficient of the implication dummy, three are statistically insignificant, one
is statistically significant at the 5% level but is positive. The liquidity-loan ratio, the only indicator
estimated to rise following the implication, is also the only measure whose numerator reflects additional
liquid resources from alternative finance.
The test results reported in Tables 5 and 6, together with those in Table 4, provide a powerful sup-
port for corruption as financial intermediation. They show that our sample publicly listed firms, even
though their performance does not worsen and their loan-payment ability does not weaken, nonethe-
less choose to default following the arrests of their connected officials. Alternative corruption theories
cannot explain our findings: if firms in those theories default following the implication, their default
cannot be strategic. It is our theory that offers an unique explanation: corruption serves as a com-
mitment mechanism to enforce financial contracts; firms default because the arrests of corrupt officials
break the commitment.
5.2 Alternative Financing
By no means, our theory predicts defaults driven by anti-corruption investigations must be strategic.
Lemma 1 posits corruption as the only financing option when the monitoring cost for other collateral is
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sufficiently high, and firm would never default strategically. Therefore, firms default strategically only if
they can access alternative financing. Proposition 2 predicts the stock-pledge finance – an alternative
to corruption – to become more active for strategically defaulting firms. In an economy with poor
institutions like China where physical collateral frequently turns “ghost", publicly listed firms’ equity
shares should act as an easily tractable and enforceable asset for collateralized borrowing.17 Corporate
bonds is another financing alternative.
To test if implicated firms substitute corruption with other alternatives, we perform DID estimations
on firms’ outstanding short-term and long-term loans as well as two alternative financing tools: stocks
shares pledged for borrowing and corporate bonds. As throughout this paper, we include firm fixed
effects, quarter-by-year fixed effects, province-specific time trends, and industry-specific time trends
in all specifications. We also control for gross profit growth, real asset growth, and leverage rate. All
dependent variables are measured as quarterly annual growth based on (16).
The results are reported in Table 7. The estimates show negligible impact of the anti-corruption
implications on the borrowings of publicly listed firms connected with investigated, corrupt officials:
the estimated coefficients on the implication dummy are statistically insignificant for both short-term
and long-term loans. However, the number of stocks pledged for loans are estimated to rise by 11%,
significant at the 10% level. We interpret these results as firms turn to alternative financing following
the implication, and SPF should be one of the alternatives. Also, corporate bonds as another alternative
are estimated to rise by 31%, significant at the 1% level. All this evidence suggests financing alternatives
other than corruption indeed become more active following the implication, complementing our findings
on strategic defaults.
5.3 Dynamics in Firm Value
Proposition 2 further predicts, when a corrupt official gets arrested, his connected firms’ value drops
on impact, not only because SPF is more costly but also because the extra loan resources occupied by
non-performing loans raise interest rates. We test this prediction by estimating (19), letting Yit to be
firm i’s stock price in quarter t. This way, the estimated coefficient on the implication dummy captures
the impact of the implication on the market value of a firm.
17China passed the Guaranty Law that became effective in 1995 and passed the Real Rights Law that became effective
in 2007. Both laws specify equity shares can be used as collateral. However, SPF did not gain much popularity until
post 2010.
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We utilize two quarterly stock price measures: the price on the last day of the quarter and the
average daily price over the entire quarter. Table 8 summarizes the results. Columns (1) and (5) report
the basic regression results without additional controls: implicated firms’ stock prices are estimated to
decline by 12% in quarters following the implication, significant at the 1% level. Columns (3) and (7)
show controlling for real asset growth, profit growth, and the leverage ratio reduces the point estimate
to 11%, still significant at the 1% level. These findings support Proposition 2’s prediction that firm
value drops after being implicated.
Our theory’s comparative static exercises cannot capture further dynamics in firm value during the
transitory dynamics. However, over time firm value will likely recover again. As more firms turn to
SPF, loan resources occupied by non-performing loans free up, which lowers the interest rate and raises
firm value. Moreover, although the model assumes for simplicity that an implicated firm will forever
be excluded from corruption, in reality a firm can form a new corruptive relationship after remedying
its damaged reputation and finding another corrupt official; this also raises firm value.
To investigate further dynamics in firm value, we add in the regression a duration measure that
indicates the number of quarters between the quarter of the implication and the current quarter. We
let this measure to interact with the implication dummy so that it equals zero for all quarters before
the implication. The estimated coefficient on the duration measure hereby captures the dynamics in
firm value following the implication. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 8 report the estimate
on the coefficient of the duration measure to be around 1.2%, significant at the 1% level; meanwhile,
the point estimate of the coefficient on the implication dummy rises to around 21%. Altogether, the
results summarized in Table 8 suggest a firm’s value declines by 12% on average among all the quarters
following the implication; in particular, it drops by about 21% on impact, and recovers by about 1.2%
per quarter afterward.
6 Conclusion
We proposes corruption can be indispensable for lending in an environment with poor institutions.
A theoretical framework is built to show the corruptive relations with government officials can serve
as financial intermediation: corrupt officials enforce financial commitments; bribes reward the official;
repeated loan issuance gives entrepreneurs the incentive to commit. To differentiate our theory from
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alternatives, we derive some unique but testable predictions: firms default on existent, corruption-
backed loans when implicated by the anti-corruption investigation; such defaults appear strategic as
long as firms manage to substitute corruption with other collateral. We examine panel data from
China, and find powerful evidence supporting these predictions.
Our findings suggest the anti-corruption campaign, although intended to improve the social effi-
ciency, may cause an unintended consequence of thwarting relationship lending if not accompanied by
reforms on institutions. In this regard, recent efforts by the Chinese supreme court to publicize infor-
mation on firm defaults and by the central bank to activate more financial tools should complement
the central government’s fight against corruption.
Although our framework highlights corruption’s social benefit as financial intermediation, more
elements can be added for considering corruption’s social cost. Heterogeneity in firm productivity can
be introduced to evaluate corruption’s impact on capital misallocation. Small firms’ reaction to the
anti-corruption investigation can be examined to explore how corruption facilitates small and medium
businesses. Our framework can also be applied to investigate how corruption impacts other forms of
finance, such as housing collateral, and other economic outcomes, such as housing prices. We leave
these for future research.
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Shuang-gui Officials Non-performing Loans
Note: Aggregate time-series plots of annual data from 2008 to 2015. "Shuang Gui" officials, plotted against the
left axis, is measured as the total number of officials newly put under investigation for corruption calculated as
the total sum of our regional sample. Non-performing loans, plotted against the right axis, is measured as the
ratio of defaulting loans to total gross loans. 2013 is the year when the national anti-corruption campaign
initiates. Data on corrupt officials is compiled from the 2007-2016 Pro-curatorial Yearbooks of China. Data on
non-performing loans is from the IMF Financial Soundness Indicator Dataset. See text for more details.
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year
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Note: time-series plots of the 2000-2015 regional average amount of non-performing loans (left axis) and the
average number of “Shuang Gui” officials newly put under corruption investigation (right axis) for 30
provinces. Non-performing loans are in 100 millions RMB. “Shuang Gui” officials are in number of individuals.
The dotted vertical line indicates the 2013 initiation of the national anti-corruption campaign. See text for
more details.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: annual regional panel
No. of obs. Years covered Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Panel A: In Levels
Corrupt Officials 464 2000-2015 95 58 4 320
(no. of individuals)
Non-performing Loans 300 2006-2015 234.6 258.0 6.2 1772.8
(100 mill RMB)
Panel B: In Annual Growth
Corrupt Officials 425 2001-2015 0.097 0.409 -0.870 3.652
Non-performing loans 270 2007-2015 0.087 0.454 -0.861 2.391
Real GDP 450 2001-2015 0.116 0.026 0.03 0.238
Note: Data on corrupt officials is from the Procuratorial Yearbooks of China, measured as the number
of officials newly put under investigation for corruption. Data on outstanding non-performing loans is
from the China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Reports. Data on real GDP growth is from the
China Statistical Year books. See text for details.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of: quarterly firm panel (1q2007-4q2017)
Panel A: Basic Information
No. of obs. Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Default 100,162 0.0069 0.0830 0 1
Anti-corruption 100,162 0.0179 0.1327 0 1
Age 100,162 15.38 5.57 0 50
No. of employee 99,053 5,571 19,375 37 60,966
Leverage ratio 99,264 0.45 0.23 0.04 1.16
Panel B: in Levels
Gross Sale (100 mill RMB) 99,262 34.72 88.54 0.06 630.15
Gross Profit (100 mill RMB) 99,262 2.64 7.12 -3.56 52.03
Cash (100 mill RMB) 99,269 13.06 29.87 0.04 217.16
Real Asset (100 mill RMB) 98,751 67.52 162.82 1.38 1190.58
Real Fixed (100 mill RMB) 98,756 16.06 45.24 0.02 341.18
Short Loan (100 mill RMB) 96,890 9.94 24.46 0 170.99
Long Loan (100 mill RMB) 91,884 10.29 35.53 0 265.93
Pledged Stock (100 mill shares) 42,304 1.27 2.15 0 136.64
Bonds (100 mill RMB) 85,545 3.72 13.98 0 104.60
Panel C: in Annual Growths
Sale Growth 85,996 0.12 0.37 -1.11 1.57
Profit Growth 86,088 0.13 2.45 -11.77 12.79
Cash Growth 86,103 0.07 0.567 -1.36 1.73
Real Asset Growth 85,638 0.12 0.24 -0.44 1.29
Real Fixed Growth 85,590 0.11 0.37 -1.16 1.56
Short Loan Growth 73,563 0.12 0.93 -2 2
Long Loan Growth 53,027 0.12 1.11 -2 2
Pledged Stock Growth 27,899 0.30 0.82 -2 2
Bonds Growth 15,329 0.35 1.11 -2 2
Note: Summary statistics of key variables for 3438 firms listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock
Exchange from 2007 to 2017. Default is a dummy that equals one if the company is reported by
the Supreme Court as having records of loan defaults in that quarter, and equals zero otherwise.
Anti − corruption is a dummy that equals one if the company is reported to have corruptive connec-
tions with an official that has been under investigation for corruption in that quarter or before, and
zero otherwise. value of all variables except for Default, Anit-corruption, and Age are winsorized
between 1% and 99%. Growth refers to annual growth measured as the change in the value from the
same quarter of last year to the current quarter divided by the average value of these two quarters,
following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Data on investigated corrupt officials are from the China’s
Central Commission of Discipline Inspection; data on defaults are from the the Supreme People’s
Court of China. See text for more details.
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Table 3: Regional Non-performing Loans: OLS
“Shuang Gui" Officials (1) (2)
Contemporaneous 0.382*** 0.401*** 0.396*** 0.097* 0.114** 0.107**
(0.104) (0.087) (0.075) (0.047) (0.050) (0.046)
Cumulatively 0.888*** 0.914*** 0.208** 0.207**
in one year (0.115) (0.110) (0.079) (0.080)
Cumulatively 1.213*** 0 .232**
in two years (0.181) (0.100)
Cumulative coefficients -4.469** -3.728* -4.125*
on regional output (1.754) (2.215) (2.2value76)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
R square 0.085 0.204 0.217 0.728 0.724 0.721
F statistics 13.60 42.33 28.79 50.47 54.65 54.55
Sample Size 245 237 231 245 237 231
Note: OLS estimates of the coefficients on the number of officials newly put under investigation for
corruption (“Shuang Gui”), based on a sample of 30 provinces from 2006 to 2015. Column (1) reports
those without controlling for regional GDP growth or including year fixed effects. Column (2) reports
those with controls. Robust standard errors clustered by regions are in parentheses. All estimations are
conducted in growth rates. ***1%-level significance; ** 5%-level significance; * 10%-level significance.
See text for more details.
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Table 4: Firm Defaults: Difference in Difference
Dependent Variable: Default Dummy
Linear Probability Model Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Anti-Corruption 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.101**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.051)
ln(employee) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)














Region×trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry×trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter×year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R square 0.0087 0.0089 0.0092 0.0093 0.0088 0.11
Sample Size 100,162 99,033 85,431 85,431 100,162 100,162
Note: Difference-in-difference estimation results of firm defaults on anti-corruption implications. Default dummy
equals one if the company or one of its branches is reported by the Supreme Court as having records of loan
defaults in that quarter, and equals zero otherwise. Anti-corruption is a dummy that equals one if the company
is reported to have corruptive connections with an official that has been under investigation for corruption in
that quarter or before, and zero otherwise. The regression is based on a quarterly panel of 3438 publicly listed
firms from 2007 to 2017. Data on anti-corruption investigation is from China’s Central Commission of Discipline
Inspection; data on defaults are from the the Supreme People’s Court of China. Standard errors clustered by
firms are reported in parenthesis. ***1%-level significance; **5%-level significance; *10%-level significance. See
text for more details.
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Table 5: Defaults and Firm Performance : Difference in Difference
Gross Profit Net Profit Gross Rev. Net Rev. Cash Holdings
Anti-Corruption -0.0157 0.0795 0.0021 0.005 0.0307*
(0.0806) (0.0784) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0159)
ln(emp) -0.0126 0.0140 0.0329*** 0.0308*** -0.0285***
(0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0034)
Real Asset Growth 0.9242*** 0.8900*** 0.6889*** 0.6724*** 1.2181***
(0.0389) (0.0379) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0076)
Leverage 0.3173*** 0.2869*** 0.0581*** 0.0670*** -0.0017
(0.0786) (0.0765) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0155)
Region×trends yes yes yes yes yes
Industry×trends yes yes yes yes yes
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R square 0.0113 0.0112 0.2448 0.2410 0.2520
Sample Size 85,422 85,422 85,339 85,191 85,430
Note: Difference-in-difference estimation results of firm performance on anti-corruption implications.
All five dependent variables are measured as quarterly annual growth based on Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992). “Anti-Corruption” is the difference-in-difference dummy that equals one if the firm is reported
to have corruptive connections with an official that has been under investigation for corruption in that
quarter or before, and zero otherwise. The regression is based on a quarterly panel of 3438 publicly
listed firms from 2007 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parenthesis.
***1%-level significance; ** 5%-level significance; * 10%-level significance. See text for more details.
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Table 6: Defaults and Financial Status: Difference in Difference
Panel A: Debt-payment Ability
Current Rate Super Quick Rate Quick Rate Cash Rate 1 Cash Rate 2
Anti-Corrup 0.2407*** 0.2918*** 0.2320*** 0.2056*** -0.0021
(0.0977) (.0849) (0.0911) (.0707) (.0133)
ln(emp) -0.2564*** -0.1961*** -0.2435*** -0.1762*** 0.0082**
(0.0412) (0.0343) (0.0386) ( 0.0286) (0.0041)
Real Asset -0.2628*** -0.2132*** -0.1814*** -0.1022** -0.0328***
(0.0667) (0.0537) ( 0.0630) (0.0460) ( 0.0066)
Leverage -6.7209*** -4.9040*** -5.8393*** -3.5314*** -0.1161***
(0.2658) (0.2020) (-5.8393) (0.1670) (0 .0226)
R square 0.2259 0.1980 0.2080 0.1690 0.1194
Sample Size 82,246 82,245 82,246 82,205 82,244
Panel B: Ability to Keep Loans in Good Standing
Liquidity/Loan Profit/Fin.Cost Cash/Fin.Cost Cash/Urgent Debt
Anti-Corruption 8.0962** -0.7479. 0.2676 -0.1578
(3.3899) (2.8013) ( 3.2624) ( 1.1376)
ln(employee) -0.8158 0.8823 -1.7709* 0.1495
(0.6213) ( 0.7565) ( 1.0447) ( .2459)
Real Asset Growth -0.9772 2.6195** -5.7070*** -0.1319
(0.9704) ( 1.2119) ( 1.9215) (0.4747)
Leverage -57.0567*** 2.7582 1.1559 -7.2153***
( 4.6080) ( 4.0519) ( 5.4794) ( 1.5423 )
R square 0.0422 0.0048 0.0033 0.0236
Sample Size 69,820 82,225 82,225 65,177
Note: Panel A presents the difference-in-difference estimation results of the five indicators that measure
firms’ debt payment ability; Panel B presents those of the four indicators that measure firms’ ability
to make loan payments. “Anti-corruption” is the difference-in-difference dummy that equals one if the
company is reported to have corruptive connections with an official that has been under investigation
for corruption in that quarter or before, and zero otherwise. The regression is based on a quarterly
panel of 3438 publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by firms are reported in
parenthesis. ***1%-level significance; **5%-level significance; *10%-level significance. See text for more
details.
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Table 7: Alternative Financing: Difference in Difference
Short Loan Long Loan Pledged Stocks Bonds
(1) (2) (2) (3)
Anti-Corruption 0.0280 -0.0085 0.1110* 0.3088***
(0.0456) (0.0607) (0.0620) (0.1228)
ln(age) -0.6480*** -0.3465*** -0.8781*** -0.5952*
(0.0777) (0.1314) (0.1066) (0.3302)
Real Asset Growth 1.0749*** 1.3952*** 0.3460*** 0.8648***
(0.0294) (0.0357) (0.0209) (0.1006)
Leverage 1.0328*** 0.8185*** -0.5023*** 0.8584***
(0.0572) (0.0930) (0.0464) (0.2776)
Region×time trends yes yes yes yes
Industry×time trends yes yes yes yes
Quarter×year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
R square 0.1051 0.1039 0.0730 0.2202
Sample Size 72,974 52,747 27,692 15,258
Note: Difference-in-difference estimation results of the outstanding loans with terms less than
a year (Short Loan), loans with terms of at least a year (Long Loan), of the quantity of stock
shares pledged for borrowing (Pledged Stocks), and of corporate bonds (Bonds). All four
dependent variables are measured as quarterly annual growth based on Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992). Anti-corruption is the difference-in-difference dummy that equals one if the company
is reported to have corruptive connections with an official that has been under investigation
for corruption in that quarter or before, and zero otherwise. The regression is based on a
quarterly panel of 3438 publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2017. Standard errors clustered by
firms are reported in parenthesis. ***1%-level significance; **5%-level significance; *10%-level
significance. See text for more details.
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Table 8: Firm Value: Difference in Difference
End-of-quarter Stock Price Average Daily Stock Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Anti-Corrup -0.1229*** -0.2246*** -0.1054*** -0.1960*** -0.1256*** -0.2199*** -0.1096*** -0.1939***
(0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0115) (0.0170) (0.0116) (0.0178) (0.0110) (0.0165)
Duration 0.0131*** 0.0118*** 0.0121*** 0.0109***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Real Asset 0.3709*** 0.3711*** 0.3845*** 0.3846***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Leverage -0.4075*** -0.4074*** -0.4381*** -0.4380***
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Profit 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Region-specific trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-specific trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R square 0.3177 0.3181 0.3615 0.3619 0.3136 0.3140 0.3666 0.3670
Sample Size 97,313 97,313 83,801 83,801 97,313 97,313 83,801 83,801
Note: Difference-in-difference estimation results of firm value measured as stock prices. Anti-corruption is the difference-in-difference dummy
that equals one if the company is reported to have corruptive connections with an official that has been under investigation for corruption in
that quarter or before, and zero otherwise. Duration equals the number of quarters between the quarter of the implication and the current
quarter and equals zero before the implication quarter. The regression is based on a quarterly panel of 3438 publicly listed firms from 2007 to
2017. Standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parenthesis. ***1%-level significance; **5%-level significance; *10%-level significance.
See text for more details.
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7 Appendix For Online Publication
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The equilibrium has to satisfy a set of conditions,
(1) Implications of Assumptions 1 is
max{RL −RH , θRL/2, θRL − (RL −RH)} < r0 = G
′(KS) < θRL
So,
max{RL −RH , θRL/2, θRL − (RL −RH)} < G
′(K) < G′(0) < θRL
which requires,
G′(K) < max{θRL/2, RH − (1− θ)RL}, (20)
G′(0) > θRL. (21)







(2) For there exists type s for which the gain from trade in corruption backed finance
s(RH − r) +W (s) ≥ (1− θ)RL + V (s),
we have,
s ≥ sC =
(1− θ)RL





When the monitoring cost of the alternative channel of funding is zero, no one participates in corruption-
backed finance, because (1− θ)RL > RH − r under assumption (??). For
sC =
(1− θ)RL
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(3) In addition to the tradeoff the entrepreneur in a corrupt relationship faces at the beginning of each
period, she also faces a tradeoff at the end of each period, when she can choose whether to let go
the corrupt relationship and borrow wish stock-pledge finance. If the entrepreneur prefers financing
through the corrupt relationship, W (s) ≥ V (s), which implies that
rp = r0 + ξ ≥ (1− κ)γr + (1− (1− κ)γ) [RH − (1− θ)RL/s]
= γr0 + (1− γ) [RH − (1− θ)RL/s] + κγ {r0 +RH − θRL − (1− θ)RL/s}
Suppose the condition above holds for all s. Then,
κ ≤
(1− γ) [r0 + (1− θ)RL −RH ] + ξ
γ (r0 +RH −RL)
For positive ξ, when κ is small enough, then (2) and (3) are both satisfied
(4) for sE = (1−β)(1−θ)RL
RH−r−ξ
< 1,
ξ < RH −G
′(0)− (1− β)(1− θ)RL.
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(5) for sE < sC , notice that
sC − sE =
(1− θ)RL






RH − r − ξ
= (1− βˆ)(1− θ)RL
βˆ (RH − r)− (1 + βˆ)ξ[
(1− βˆ)(RH − r) + βξ
]
(RH − r − ξ)


















(1− θ)RL −RH +























































Collecting conditions we have,











W (s) ≥ V (s), ∀s ≥ max{sE , sC} → κ ≤ κ2 =
(1− γ) [r0 + (1− θ)RL −RH ] + ξ
γ (r0 +RH −RL)












For ξ > ξ ≡ 1−βˆ
βˆ
[




, βˆ > β and κ < κ ≡ min{κ1, κ2, κ3}, entrepreneurs
with connections to officials choose corruption backed finance when s ≥ sC , entrepreneurs without
connections rely on SPF if s ≥ sE .
KS , KC , and KE are all weakly decreasing functions r0, if there exists an equilibrium, the equilib-
rium must be unique. When r0 = G
′(K), KS = K, so that KS +KC +KE exceeds the total supply
of capital. When r0 = G
′(0), KS = 0, KS + KC + KE < 1 + κ ≤ K, by assumption 4. Therefore,
there exists an equilibrium with G′(K) ≤ r0 ≤ G
′(0).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By assumption 3, intensifying anticorruption campaign increases capital demand from corrup-
tion backed finance, KC , for any given risk free rate r0. By 15, an increase in κ increases K
E . Thus,
to clear the capital market, r0 has to increase.
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